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RECENT CASE NOTES
Indiana's position on this problem is not clear.2 2 Analogous decisions, 2 3
however, indicate that the modern trend would be followed, at least in the
sealed package cases. Nevertheless, the influence of leading cases, may limit
recovery.2 4 Should the issue arise in Indiana it is to be hoped that the court
will consider the analysis of this decision.
Fortunately, the court in the principal case did not attempt to justify its
decision by a further application of fictions. The holding is in line with the
modern tendency to impose the liability of a warrantor upon the manufac-
turer of food irrespective of contractual relations. It is submitted that the
result of the case, based on a direct interpretation of the Sales Act, is sound
in principle and clearly desirable in policy. H. R. H.
TORTS-PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BY UNEMANCIPATED BROTHER AGAINST UN-
EMANCIPATED SIrsr.-Plaintiff, a boy of twelve, was injured in an automobile
collision while a passenger in the car negligently driven by defendant, his
sister, sixteen years of age. Both parties were unemancipated and lived with
their parents and were being supported by their father. From a judgment
allowing recovery, defendant appealed, principally on the grounds that public
policy forbids the maintenance of such actions, and that to allow such actions
is an incentive to fraud where insurance is available for the payment of
any recovery allowed. Held, that judgment be affirmed. Rozell v. Rozell (New
York, 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 254.1
An infant is generally responsible for his own torts. 2 Persons who are
not in domestic relations with a minor who negligently injures them may
recover damages from him.3 The overwhelming weight of authority is that
an action for personal injury will not lie when either the parents or unemanci-
22 No Indiana decisions directly on the point have been found.
23 See: Heise v. Gillette (1925), 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N. E. 182, noted 1
Ind. L. J. 54 (purchase of food in restaurant is a sale accompanied by an
implied warranty); Morris v. Trinkle (1930), 91 Ind. App. 657, 170 N. E. 101
(where the defendant sold auto subject to warranty of the manufacturer on
the reverse side of the order, he thereby adopted such warranty as his own) ;
Wallace v. Shoemaker (1924), 194 Ind. 419, 143 N. E. 285; Musselman v. Wise
(1882), 84 Ind. 248; The York Mfg. Co. v. Bonnell (1900), 24 Ind. App. 667,
57 N. E. 590.
24 Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., Inc. (1923), 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576, 27
A. L. R. 1533; Prinsen v. Russos (1927), 194 Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (friends
of the buyer denied recovery); Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., Inc. (Conn.
1938), 3 At. (2d) 224.
1 "No logical reason nor reported authority exists to indicate that the rule
of liability (that persons who are not members of the family, when injured
through the tortious negligence of minors, may recover damages against them
by way of compensation for injuries sustained) should be changed when
brothers and sisters are involved. . . .Neither the Constitution, statutes nor
judicial decisions of the State directly or by fair implication declare any State
policy against which the maintenance of such an action offends." Rozell v.
Rozell (N. Y., 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 254.2 Vasse v. Smith (1810), 6 Cranch 226; Cooley on Torts (1932), 4th ed.,
vol. 1, sec. 66; see, Daugherty v. Reveal (1913), 54 Ind. App. 71, 102 N. E.
381.
3 Hopkins v. Droppers (1926), 191 Wisc. 334, 210 N. W. 684; Moore v.
Wilson (1929), 180 Ark. 41, 20 S. W. (2d) 310; Peterson v. Haffner (1877),
59 Ind. 130.
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pated child sues the other.4 Nor will it lie where an adult child sues for
injuries received during minority.5 It is a policy of the law that courts will
recognize the necessity of preserving parental discipline and seek to maintain
harmonious family relationships and the tranquility of the home.6 Is this
doctrine applicable to suits between unemancipated minors in the same family?
In the only other case found in which the question of whether an uneman-
cipated infant may sue his minor brother or sister in tort for personal injuries
was directly considered,7 the court held the action maintainable.8 The court
had in an earlier case allowed a boy of nine to recover from his brother for
injuries sustained while riding in an automobile driven by his brother whose
negligence caused a collision with a truck.9 The defendant brother was over
twenty-one years of age but still resided in the same home with the plaintiff.
In the later case the court asserted that, if a minor may sue his brother who
lived at home, though he was over twenty-one, "it is no great stretch from that
to hold that he may sue a brother so living under that age".1o There, an
insurance policy on the owner's car covered any injury caused by use of the
automobile.
What weight should be given to the existence of blood relationship as a
protection to the tort-feasor? Shall the arguments of public policy which deny
actions between unemancipated child and parent be extended to the relation-
ships of brothers and sisters? These questions are fundamental in the con-
sideration which courts must give to this problem. It would seem that the
desire for domestic tranquility and the preservation of parental discipline and
control should prevail, if at all, only as to the parental relationship. 1 1 It
4 (a) Child suing parent: Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885; Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788; Wick v. Wick (1927),
192 Wisc. 260, 212 N. W. 787; Lund v. Olson (1931), 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.
W. 188. Contra: Treschman v. Treschman (1901), 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E.
961, in which the court allowed an action, by a thirteen-year-old girl against
her step-mother for injuries resulting from an assault and battery on ground
that wrong maliciously inflicted should be redressed though the defendant
stands in loco parentis, in so far as it may be done through an action for
damages. See also, Minkin v. Minkin (Pa., 1939), 7 At. (2d) 461.
(b) Parent suing child: Schneider v. Schneider (1930), 160 Md. 18, 152
Atl. 498; Duffy v. Duffy (1935), 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 500, 178 Atl. 165; contra:
Wells v. Wells (Mo. App., 1932), 48 S. W. (2d) 109.
5 Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128.
6 For an enlightening criticism of these reasons put forth by the courts,
see, Harper, The Law of Tort (1933), No. 285, pp. 626-627. Also see, McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930), 43 Harvard L. Rev.
1030, pp. 1072-1077, for a discussion and criticism of seven considerations
which are said to be influencing the courts in this matter.
7 See note in 37 Mich. L. Rev. 658 (1939).
8Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1938), 229 Wisc. 581,
281 N. W. 671.
9 Bielke v. Knaack (1932), 207 Wisc. 490, 242 N. W. 176. The court said:
"We perceive no sound reason for holding that a brother should not be
liable to a brother for a tort committed upon him."
10 Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1938), 229 Wisc. 581,
281 N. W. 671.
11 See, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations," 43 Harvard L. Rev.
1030, p. 1079, where Professor McCurdy suggests as a solution to the question
of whether a child should have a cause of action against a parent for an
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does not follow that a suit between two unemancipated minors will disturb
the "family tranquility" any more than it has already been disturbed by the
commission of the tort.1 2 In fact, it has been suggested that in reality, where
insurance is available, the suit and recovery will be to the good interests of
both parties.13 Such reasoning is applicable as well to suits between husband
and wife and between parent and child.
The insurance factor was not raised squarely or considered by the Court
of Appeals, though the defendant attempted to point out that such actions are
invitations to fraud, particularly in cases where the owner of the automobile
is insured against liability for personal injuries.14 Numerous cases have held
that there is no liability even when the parent is protected by liability insur-
ance, and that insurance cannot itself create a liability.15  Nevertheless, it
cannot be denied that the transfer of the liability to a third party through the
medium of insurance removes an element basic to the denial of recovery or at
least smoothes the way for the court to allow recovery.' 6 Since the objective
of insurance is to distribute the loss among all those exposed to a common
danger, why is not such a theory applicable as well to the injured brother or
sister or child? Why should recovery be denied the brother of the defendant
but allowed a stranger, when normally, in either event, it would be the
insurance company that pays? It is true that there arises the danger of
injury occurring during minority, that the law recognize a privilege, either
absolute or qualified, only as to those matters within parental discipline and
control and for the conduct of the domestic establishment.
12 "If permitting a suit by a brother against a sister to recover for injuries
received by the former through the tortious negligence of the latter is to tear
asunder the ties that sustain the family unity . . ., then indeed it must be
held together by a slender thread." Rozell v. Rozell (N. Y., 1939), 22 N. E.
(2d) 254.
13 See, Lusk v. Lusk (1932), 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538, 539. Accord:
Dunlap v. Dunlap (1930), 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905.
14 The evidence in the case does not show who was the owner of the car
the defendant was driving, and there is a dispute at present as to such owner-
ship at the time of the accident. However, in the argument, defendant's counsel
stated that the owner of the car was protected by liability insurance, and that
otherwise the action would not have been brought. The record itself contains
nothing as to insurance.
Actually the defendant's father had an indemnity policy on one of his cars,
but the insurance company claims that the car involved in the accident was
not covered at the time because it had been transferred by the father to
another. The question of coverage is now being litigated.
The insurance company came in to defend under an agreement that it
was to waive none of its rights by doing so. Under the New York statute,
resort could be had to the owner (Vehicle and Traffic Law, Sec. 59) or the
insurance carrier, if there was one (Insurance Law, Sec. 109), where the car
was operated with the express or implied permission of the owner.
15Lund v. Olson (1931), 183 Minn. 515, 237 N. XV. 188; Norfolk Southern
R. Co. v. Gretakis (1934), 162 Va. 597, 174 S. E. 841; Rambo v. Rambo (1938),
195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. (2d) 468.
16 When the principal case was before the Appellate Division (256 App.
Div. 61, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901, 904), the court there said: "In view of the fact
that the owner of the automobile in which the litigants were riding was pro-
tected by liability insurance it can hardly be said that the prosecution of this
action is a menace to family discipline or is calculated to destroy the family
unit."
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domestic fraud and collusion, but that is not a proper basis for the denial
of a right to recovery. 1 7
It is submitted that the holding in the present case is a forward step in
allowing recovery in tort for personal injuries. Those reasons denominated
public policy which the courts have held constitute a bar to the maintenance
of intra-family suits are inapplicable to the situation presented by a suit
between two unemancipated minors in the same family, and there is some
doubt as to their applicability at all under present-day conditions. The Court
of Appeals in the principal case examined the classical rule in the light of
modern economic and social progress and recognized that it may be outdated
and outmoded. The court seemed to suggest that it may change such rule
without waiting for legislative action. Considering the dominant part which
the automobile plays in modern life and the widespread use of insurance to
avoid losses from motoring accidents, the development of tort law in the
direction here indicated is both needed and justifiable.IS S. C.
EVIDENCE-TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY-ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDGMENTS APPOINT-
ING GUARDIANs.-The plaintiffs, heirs at law, contested a will, made in 1926
by the testatrix who died in 1936, on the ground of unsoundness of mind at the
time of making the will. Defendants are the administratrix and devisees.
Plaintiffs introduced over defendants' objection a judgment in 1928 appointing
a guardian for testatrix because of incompetency to manage her estate. Held,
reversed. Where the issue is the unsoundness of mind of the person at the
time of making a will, a subsequent judgment appointing a guardian because of
incompetency' to manage the estate is not admissible as evidence. Lasher v.
Gerlach (Ind. App. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 296.
17 "If it should appear that there is any foundation for the suggestion, a
means of protection may be found in diligence on the part of the insurance
carriers to ferret out and expose the fictitious claims and reliance may be
placed on our courts and juries to detect and prevent a fraud." Rozell v.
Rozell (N. Y., 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 254. See, LoGalbo v. LoGalbo (1930),
138 Misc. Rep. 485, 246 N. Y. S. 565, p. 568.
18 Insurance has been considered as an important factor in recent cases
involving this and similar problems and, it is contended, will be more so in
the future, no matter what the actual language used by the courts may be.
Said Lord Blackburn in Young v. Rankin (1934), S. C. 499, p. 514: "The
practice of a parent insuring himself against claims which may arise out of
his own negligence in the conduct of some particular matter is of very recent
date, and had such practice existed at an earlier date I have no doubt that
the very question that is raised in this action would have been brought before
the courts long ago, for I do not see anything unnatural in a minor recovering
damages from his parent where the parent is himself covered against any
loss incurred by him as the result of his negligence. I, accordingly, attach little
importance to the fact that there are no reported cases on the subject."
Possibly the desired result may be achieved in an indirect manner through
legislative action requiring compulsory insuranec for automobiles and allowing
recovery to be had directly from an insurer by the one injured through the
negligence of the insured. See, Mesite v. Kirchstein (1929), 109 Conn. 77,
145 At. 753, 755.
1 Incompetency as used herein designates the disabilities set out in Burns
Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), sec. 8-301; Ind. Acts 1911, ch. 218, sec. 1, p. 533, and
Ind. Acts 1919, ch. 106, sec. 1, p. 580. As to what constitutes unsoundness of
mind see Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), see. 8-202; 2 Ind. R. S. 1852, ch. 14,
see. 2, p. 333, and Ind. Acts 1895, ch. 99, sec. 1, p. 205.
